

CONFIDENTIAL


11-3220

10 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

REFERENCE : General Erskine's Notes

I agree with General Cabell's comments. I do not agree that my office is organized or well-placed for the "informal and off the record staffing" which General Erskine's notes mention. It seems to me that any extensive staff work on such matters in the Agency is a function of other offices. I do think that my office should be as helpful as possible to other Agency offices as well as to offices such as General Erskine's. It strikes me that the problem that concerns General Erskine here is primarily a Department of Defense matter.


L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Director (Coordination)

cc: DDCI

Attachment: Gen. Erskine's Notes

JCS review(s) completed.

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AWD/Enc

The DCI has several times recently expressed to the Secretary of Defense USIB's interest in and hope for support of undertakings involving DOD resources. Two examples are [redacted]

Similarly, financing a [redacted] increase in the [redacted] contract translation project has been put on today's USIB agenda.

We believe it would be useful to explore possible staffing arrangements by which such matters might be preliminarily looked into by CIA and OSD together with any other immediately involved elements. An agreed informal SOP should, as a general rule, help expedite concrete action and insure the smoothest possible handling.

Gen. Truscott's office and OSO are both well placed to do the necessary informal and off-the-record staffing within their respective organizations. It should be possible for them in most cases together quickly to identify the elements of an issue. In many cases they should be able to propose to their principals a realistic and mutually acceptable solution. In the few cases where a USIB statement is indicated, the two offices can put clearly into focus the points requiring action and suggest the means of achieving a solution.

Our experience concerning [redacted] is illustrative. In the spring of 1958 OSD arranged for the support of this promising Army project after the BOB had denied CIA the opportunity to help. These arrangements were carried through smoothly without the need for IAC intervention. Recently the Army briefed USIB on its [redacted] program,

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including [redacted]. Directly, USIB expressed its support to the Secretary of Defense. It was not until the Army vigorously employed the USIB letter in support of an expanded [redacted] proposal that OSD learned that ACSI's earlier proposal for [redacted] had been disapproved within the Army itself. The Army's [redacted] proposal went substantially beyond what USIB and its chairman considered they were endorsing. But in the process, the facts were obscured, and a false pressure was built up, based on misinterpretation of the USIB views which its chairman had expressed. We believe preliminary discussions among CIA, ACSI, and OSD could have made the issues more clear and, on balance, could have saved much time and energy.

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There is a genuine practical and psychological advantage in the Service intelligence chiefs' having the prestige of USIB available to help them when really necessary to throw into clear relief the national interest behind some of their undertakings which may be unsympathetically viewed within their own Services. If this prestige is used sparingly and only when needed, it will be genuinely effective. But there may be an understandable tendency for the Service intelligence to invoke it too often; even through to do so weakens it in the end. We believe CIA and OSD are in a position to avoid this happening.

To return to the solution: a flexible, sensitive, and discreet CIA-OSD means is indicated for identifying and accurately defining issues,

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resolving some of them where possible, providing a realistic appraisal when USIB referral is necessary, and accomplishing the needed preliminary staffing when Board action is desirable.

All of what has been said refers to issues involving additional DOD resources. The point is that such resources are the object of competition between numerous operational as well as intelligence programs. OSO, working with informed and sympathetic officials in COMP, R&E, ARPA, etc., is prepared to arrive at a sound preliminary estimate of DOD realities before USIB action; in many cases it should be able to spare the need therefor, and when such action is needed, it should be able to assure the most favorable OSD venue. Gen. Truscott, similarly, is ideally situated and equipped to perform a like function in CIA; and working with the OSO staff, his people should be able to deal quickly, effectively and unobtrusively with very many of the major support problems of the intelligence business.

One last thought: Through such an arrangement, we should make additional progress toward viewing each individual intelligence claim on resources in the over-all context. In DOD, we have observed, intelligence undertakings tend to come to the fore ^{separation.} ~~separation.~~ It is rare, unless we force it deliberately, that a comparison of expectations is made as between, say, spending [] to detect Soviet missiles firings, as against [] for the same purpose, or

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[] to reinforce generally the attache system, or [] for

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[] Each case comes before OSD and before the Board independently and unrelatedly.

Neither Gen. Truscott and Gen. Erskine should be expected to make the final determination as to how resources will be devoted; but together they can usefully serve the DCI, the Board, and the Secretary of Defense as disinterested and appropriately staffed individuals. They can define and weigh preliminarily against each other the intelligence programs which compete for support among themselves and with other non-intelligence programs.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Cabell

FROM : General Truscott

SUBJECT:

DATE: 18 March 1959

Here are the papers I mentioned at the Deputies' Meeting this morning. [redacted] are all thoroughly familiar with this problem in case you need further advice.

As I told you this morning, I think I will stay away for 10 days to 2 weeks and see if I can get myself straightened out.

LKT

18 March 1959

ER 11-2328

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Comments on Mr. Quarles' letter dated 19 February 1959
and General Erskine's letter dated 5 March 1959

MR. QUARLES' LETTER

1. Essentially, Mr. Quarles' letter addresses itself to the arrangements proposed in your letter of January 22.

a. He notes that the ARPA Space Surveillance Requirements Panel is completing its work and that a draft of Intelligence Requirements for information about Soviet and other foreign space activities is being submitted to the Board for consideration and appropriate action. He agrees that the Board should assume responsibility for similar work in the future, and appears to hope the same Panel can be continued.

b. His comments on proposed intelligence relations to provide R&D and operational guidance to projects [] and [] were less specific, but he does state that intelligence support for [] "may now be formalized within the USIB structure". In general, he recognizes the importance of continuing intelligence support for such activities, but emphasizes the importance of "military research and operational requirements, such as early warnings, which have ramifications beyond those of intelligence alone". In effect, therefore, he accepted USIB's jurisdiction over foreign-intelligence considerations, including requirements, but made clear that these would not necessarily govern R&D or operations decisions about such projects.

c. While he indicated that the work of the ARPA Panel should be continued, he also comments that "the question of ARPA's participation in certain Board activities should be deferred at this time". Defense obviously looks to General Erskine's office for normal ARPA relationships with the intelligence community.

d. The problems in Mr. Quarles' letter dealing with intelligence guidance to [] etc. are related to improving and guiding the intelligence-collection potential of U. S. reconnaissance satellites and perhaps other means of overflights or peripheral flights to obtain highest-priority intelligence of all kinds on foreign areas, primarily through photographic, electronic (COMINT/ELINT), infrared, and other sophisticated technical means -- rather than being

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aimed directly at Space Surveillance to obtain information on foreign satellite programs, centered around [] This area obviously poses special problems for the Agency and for the Community. Mr. Quarles' letter should be circulated to the members of the Board for information, but no reply on your part seems necessary.

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GENERAL ERSKINE'S LETTER

2. On 5 March, General Erskine transmitted to you, as Chairman of USIB, a letter from Mr. Johnson forwarding the ARPA Panel's proposed national intelligence requirements for Space Surveillance and other foreign space activities, and including background on other related material. General Erskine's letter recommends three appropriate Board actions: (a) action on the intelligence requirements, (b) assignment of responsibility for space collection, etc., to an appropriate working group or standing committee of USIB, and (c) determination of the Board's will with respect to community participation in surveillance facilities operated by Defense and NASA.

3. Since there is an urgent need by ARPA for action on the intelligence requirements, the Board should act on these at the meeting on 24 March. I would suggest that at that time the Board might ask OMAIC and SIC to review the intelligence requirements which fall within their respective responsibilities, and early notification of approval be forwarded to ARPA. With regard to General Erskine's second and third recommendations, decisions on these questions are most important but they are less urgent than approval of the intelligence requirements referred to in the first.

4. After action on General Erskine's first recommendation, I would suggest a preliminary discussion of his second and third suggestions. Meanwhile, representatives of various offices are seeking to develop agreement as to arrangements which CIA might consider suitable.

L. K. TRUESCOTT, JR.
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Director (Coordination)

LKT:mfb

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DCI:

This is a copy
of the paper
Gen. Erskine talked
from ^{prior to} ~~before~~ USFIB
meeting today. I
reserved the rights
of the Board to
take these actions
whether or not his
office consulted.

CPC 3/31/59

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL CABELL

Mr. Dulles brought this in; said he assumes no further action but asked that we check this with you.



for file.
CR
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File
E/R
gr
16 April
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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